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The Defendant-Appellant

is JAMES WESTON DECKER, a

natural person, a propertyowner of real estate located in
Ogden, Weber County, Utah.
The Plaintiff-Appellee OGDEN CITY CORPORATION is a Utah
municipal corporation.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

2

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

SUMMARIES OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS

8

ARGUMENT

10

CONCLUSION
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
D.D.A. vs State (State ex rel D.A.),
2009 UT 83, 222 P.3d 1172 (Utah 2009) . . .

3, 22

Howell vs Howell,
806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993)

. .3

Jacobsen Investment Company vs State Tax Commission,
839 P.2d 789 (Utah Supreme Court 1992) . . . . 2
Salt Lake City vs Wheeler,
24 Utah 2d 112, 466 P.2d 838 (Utah 1970)
State vs Pena,
869 P.2d 932 (Utah Supreme Court 1994)

. .
. . . .

State by and through Hansen vs Salt Lake City,
21 Utah 2d 318, 445 P.2d 691 (Utah 1968) . .
Tooele Associates Limited vs Tooele City,
2011 UT 04, 247 P.3d 371 (Utah 2011) .

21
2
21

3, 22, 23

United Park City Mines vs Greater Park City Co.,
870 P.2d 880 (Utah Supreme Court 1993) . . . .
V-1 Oil Company vs Utah State Tax Commission,
942 P.2d 906 (Utah Supreme Court 1997) . . .

2
22

V-1 Oil Company vs Dept of Environmental Quality,
939 P.2d 1192 (Utah 1997)
17, 18
Walker vs Brigham City,
856 P.2d 347 (Utah 1993)

22

Weber Basin Home Builders Assn vs Roy City,
26 Utah 2d 215, 487 P.2d 866 (Utah 1971) . . .

21

West Valley City vs Foy,
100 P.3d 275 (Utah Court of Appeals 2004)

. . 27

Constitutional provisions
Article I, §7, Utah Constitution . . 4, 8, 16, 27
Article I, §12, Utah Constitution

...

4, 8, 16

Statutory provisions
Section 10-11-1 et seq, Utah Code

. .

6, 25, 26

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OGDEN CITY CORPORATION,
a Utah municipal
corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellee
vs
JAMES WESTON DECKER,
Defendant-Appellant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

)

Docket No. 20110051CA

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is granted in
accordance with the provisions of Section 78A-4-103(2)(j),
Utah Code, and the "pour over" order of the Utah Supreme
Court.
Appellate jurisdiction of this case
in

the

justice

appropriate,

as

court
the

is

appealed

although arising

nevertheless
issues

focus

valid
upon

and
the

constitutionality of the OGDEN CITY ordinance (authorizing
the assessment of the $500 "per letter" fee), in violation
of constitutional "due process" standards and limitations,
particularly in derogation of the relevant Utah statute
expressly controlling the situation. The imposition of those
$500 per letter costs, in the face of Article I, Section 12
of the Utah Constitution, when the accused person must pay
a non-refundable "hearing request fee" in order to challenge
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the imposition of the fees and/or the underlying violation,
is likewise unconstitutional.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This

appeal

(and

the predicate

factual

situation

surrounding it) presents the following issues for review:
1.

That OGDEN CITY, as a political subdivision,

cannot violate a propertyowner's right of "due
process of law" by collecting a fee in advance as
a pre-condition for the exercise of those "due
process" rights.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's conclusions of
law in civil cases are reviewed for correctness.
United Park City Mines Company vs Greater Park
City Company,

870 P. 2d 880, 885

(Utah Supreme

Court 1993) . This standard of review has also been
referred to as a "correction of error standard".
Jacobsen

Investment

Company

vs

State

Tax

, Commission, 839 P. 2d 7 8 9, 790 (Utah Supreme Court
1992).

"Correction

of

error"

means

that

no

particular deference is given to the trial court's
ruling on questions of law. State vs Pena, 869
P.2d

932, 936

(Utah Supreme Court 1994). The

"correction of error" standard means that the
appellate court decides the matter for itself and
does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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3.

The judgment of the District Court judicially

upholding

and

enforcing

the

"civil

fines"

improperly imposed by the administrative official
cannot stand and must be set aside.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF APPEAL: See
comment to #1, above.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Article

I,

Section

12, of

the

Utah

Constitution

provides, in relevant part:
In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. . . .
Emphasis added.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant-Appellant JAMES WESTON DECKER, a natural
person, is the owner of certain real estate located at 2026
Madison Street in Ogden, Weber County, Utah. The real estate
is subject

to

the geopolitical

"jurisdiction"

of

the

Defendant OGDEN CITY, a Utah municipal corporation.
In 2006 and 2007 code enforcement officers of OGDEN
CITY concluded that DECKER, as property-owner of the real
estate, was in violation of several

"junk and debris"

(undersigned's terminology) ordinances of the City, in that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the real estate had junk, debris, weeds, and similar items
thereon which had not been removed.
OGDEN CITY Code Enforcement Officer Robert Porter
[hereinafter "Officer Porter"] sent to Mr DECKER a "notice
of

violation"

concerning

the

observed

situation,

and

administratively assessed and imposed a $125 civil penalty.
DECKER'S

"request

for hearing",

as

indicated

and

invited in Officer Porter's "letter citation", was denied by
the CITY because of DECKER'S failure to pay the $25 "hearing
request fee" required by ordinance as a pre-condition to
granting the hearing.
Officer Porter re-inspected the parcel, saw essentially
the same "violation" conditions, and mailed a second "notice
of violation" to DECKER, this time assessing a $250 penalty
(ostensibly justified on the basis of the herein-challenged
OGDEN CITY ordinance providing for the same) because Porter
had

to

write

the

"second"

letter

to

DECKER.

Porter

ultimately wrote over the course of a months-long period
seven other "notice of violation" letters, for each of which
he imposed an additional

$500 penalty. Eventually the

aggregate of the "$500 penalties" for each of the "notice of
violation"

letters OGDEN CITY

(through and by Officer

Porter) came to $3875.
During

the

course

of the bench

trial before the

District Court, uncontroverted evidence was adduced that:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1.

OGDEN CITY did not clean up the property, as

described by Section 10-11-1 et seq, Utah Code
[hereinafter "the statute"],
2.

OGDEN CITY did not. incur any costs in the

clean-up

and

removal

of

the

offending

junk

(because the CITY did not undertake any removal
efforts).
3.

OGDEN CITY did not forward its bill of costs

(non-existent, as noted herein)

to the Weber

County authorities, for imposition as a "lien" if
found to be valid and reasonable by the Weber
County Board of Commissioners, as the statute
requires. The municipal Ordinance (allowing the
per letter fee) doesn't require such. This is the
basis for Defendant's "no due process" claim: for
municipal ordinance to impose a fee when state
statute says it is to go the other way (clean up
the yard at city expense) and make monetary claim
against DECKER is a violation of due process.
4.

No criminal charges for the "misdemeanor"

violations
Porter's

(which were the subject of Officer
"notice

of

violation"

letters)

were

brought against DECKER by OGDEN CITY.
Although DECKER attempted to request a "hearing" on
underlying matter (i.e. the violations), his request
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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denied by OGDEN CITY personnel because he did not pay the
by-ordinance required $25 "hearing request fee". [OGDEN CITY
had no procedure for waiver or deferral of payment of the
fee.] With no "hearing" and no apparent compliance (i.e.
clean-up and/or removal of the junk on the premises),
Officer Porter continued, on almost a bi-weekly basis, to
send out the "notice of violation" letters to DECKER.
Ultimately, nine such "notice of violation" letters were
sent out.
OGDEN CITY ultimately filed civil suit against DECKER
for the aggregate value ($3975) of the "notice of violation"
letters (generally $500 each letter) sent by Officer Porter
to DECKER. The civil suit was initially heard as a "small
claims court" matter before the Honorable Andrea Lockwood,
Judge of the Ogden City Municipal Justice Court. Following
the entry of judgment against him by the Justice Court,
DECKER

appealed

to

the

Second

District

Court,

Ogden

Department.
The "appeal" was heard de novo by District Court Judge
Michael Direda of the Second District Court, which (on 18
October 2010) entered judgment against DECKER in the amount
of the aggregated "$500 per letter" fee. Judge Direda denied
the Defendant's motions to find the municipal ordinance
provisions unconstitutional.
The instant appeal challenges the District Court's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ruling and judgment concerning the constitutionality of the
administratively imposed fees. [The Defendant's "guilt" of
the underlying claimed "violation" is NOT at issue within
this appeal or from the lower court proceedings: the Ogden
City Council is without enabling authority to expand the
"jurisdiction" of the Municipal Justice Court to allow the
Justice Court to consider
court"

within a filed "small claims

(civil) proceeding

the accused propertyowner's

"guilt" of the "violation" filed against him. Likewise, the
underlying ordinance does not purport to allow the court
that expanded "jurisdiction". There is, thus, no meaningful
"due process" opportunity for the accused to challenge the
assessment of the $500 per letter "penalty" assessed and
imposed against him.]
SUMMARIES OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS
The arguments of Appellant JAMES WESTON DECKER are
summarized as follows:
1.

Provisions of the Utah Constitution (Article

I, Section 7) guarantee that a person not be
deprived of "property" (which in this case is the
"civil penalty" of $3875 administratively imposed
against Defendant DECKER) without "due process of
law".

Article

I,

Section

12

prevents

the

government from requiring the payment of any fee
as a pre-condition to secure any of the rights
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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guaranteed

by

the

requirement

of

OGDEN

Utah

Constitution.

CITY

that

the

The

accused

defendant pay a $25 "hearing request fee" as a
pre-condition to the granting of his request for
an administrative hearing to challenge the "civil
penalty" administratively assessed against him
violates the proscription of Article I, Section 7.
2.

The

CITY'S

imposing

the

process

of

administratively

"civil penalty"

for the claimed

"weeds and debris" violation without

actually

incurring any costs in the municipal clean-up of
such debris contradicts the mandatory requirements
of

directly

applicable

statutory

provisions

(requiring the incurring of the costs for the
clean-up), thus violating the Defendant's "due
process

of

law"

substantively

rights

seeking

because
a

the

result

City

which

is
the

Legislature has denied to the municipality.
3.

The applicable municipal ordinances and/or the

municipal

procedures

arising

therefrom

and

resulting in the administrative imposition of the
"civil

penalty"

contradiction
guarantees

to

are

against
the
thus

the

foregoing
invalid,

Defendant

in

constitutional
and

any

civil

judgment of the District Court enforcing such
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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unconstitutional impositions must be set aside and
overturned.
ARGUMENT
The substantive (i.e. debt collection proceeding) and
procedural posture of this case has structured but somewhat
restricted the nature of this case and its appeal, in which
the "constitutional" claims have been raised. In order to
properly understand this case and its appeal, the following
facts and issues must be first understood:
1.

The "civil case" which is the basis for this

litigation was NOT to determine or ascertain the
underlying "guilt" of the Defendant (DECKER), as
propertyowner of the "criminal violation". [This
element may at first blush appear to be a "civil
law" prerequisite to the City's monetary recovery,
but that oversimplifies the analysis. The CITY'S
claim is based upon the claim by Code Enforcement
Officer Porter that he alone
executioner" style

in a "judge, jury,

had determined the "guilt"

(or at least the financial culpability) of the
propertyowner and thus he sent out the letters.
There

was

no

judicial

determination

of

the

Defendant's "guilt" of the claimed "violation".]
2.

The CITY is "stuck with" the provisions of its

ordinance, as well as the conduct of its officials
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(Porter) taken in compliance thereof.
3.

The

CITY

cannot

be

heard

to

deny

the

strictures of its own ordinance: that is, that the
propertyowner receiving the administrative "letter
citation" owes the fee. Any "guilt" determination
has been made by Code Enforcement Officer Porter
and that's it: he's acting in a role which quite
literally makes him judge, jury and executioner,
in addition to his "accuser" role. That's not
constitutionally acceptable.
4.

The District Court was requested to determine

only the "civil liability" of the CITY'S claim
(for entitlement to the $3875, pursuant to the
administrative

fines

Code

Enforcement

Officer

Porter administratively assessed against Defendant
DECKER).
This is a "civil case", purporting to collect a civil
indebtedness. The case was originally filed in the "small
claims" division of the Ogden City Justice Court, which
ruled

in

favor

of

the

municipality

on

the

claimed

indebtedness. On appeal to the Second Judicial District
Court in and for Weber County, a bench trial (de novo) was
held. The District Court ruled in favor of the municipality
on the claimed indebtedness and entered civil judgment
against the Defendant in the amount of $3875. This appeal
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was taken from that judgment.
The Defendant was never "convicted" in "criminal" court
of the "violations"

under city ordinance, misdemeanors

he was accused of. There was never any court proceeding in
which the Defendant's "guilt" of the underlying violation
was ever established. The original "small claims" proceeding
and the "trial de novo" proceeding were NOT adjudicated on
the basis of the underlying guilt of the violation. [Those
courts did not have jurisdiction over that offense, because
no Information had been filed. Likewise, the "small claims"
case was filed as a civil, debt collection case.] Likewise,
the case was presented by the City as an obligation owed
cumulatively $3875 for the nine

"letters" sent out by

Officer Porter and the Defendant's inadequate response
thereto.
The CITY'S practice of assessing the "per letter"
charges
thereafter

first $125, then $250, then $500 for each "letter"
was described by Officer Porter in his oral

testimony before the District Court, thus:
QUESTION (by Assistant City Attorney STRATFORD):
Okay and how long do you usually wait between
inspection periods as you go forward?
ANSWER
(by Witness
provides for 15 days.

Porter):

Municipal

code

QUESTION:
And so it's your policy as a
municipal appointed inspector to go out about
every two weeks or so then to see if the issue has
been resolved?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ANSWER:

Yes, sir.

QUESTION:
And then did you return
property on or about December 4, 2006?
ANSWER:

to the

Yes, sir.

QUESTION:
I'm handling the witness a picture,
Your Honor, and a statement dated December 5,
2006. It's marked as P-2. And again, if you could
just describe briefly for the Court, had the
conditions improved at all between these two
visits?
ANSWER:
No sir, they were exactly alike,
same appliances, same position. So I issued a $250
civil citation.
QUESTION:
And is your decision how much that
citation is or how was that amount determined?
ANSWER:
The
violation
penalties
are
scheduled in the municipal code. They're set by
the City Council.
QUESTION:
And then the computer generates that
based on the frequency of the violation?
ANSWER:

Yes, sir.

TRANSCRIPT OF OCTOBER 2010 BENCH TRIAL. Page 12, Line 15

through Page 13, Line 14. Emphasis added. A minute or so
later the witness' testimony was:
QUESTION:
And did you find the violation to be
a continuing violation?
ANSWER:
Yes, sir. The original violation was
still in place and it had grown.
QUESTION:
And at that date, what happens to
the penalties associated with the citation?
ANSWER:
The violation was still the same for
junk and debris. It was not in compliance so I
issued a third citation.
QUESTION:

And in what amount?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ANSWER:

$500.

QUESTION:
Okay, and after you get your third
citation does the amount stay the say at $500?
ANSWER:
are $500.

All subsequent citations after that

QUESTION:
Okay. Now, does the code provide
only for citations of $500 every two weeks or does
it provide for more frequent potential
ANSWER:
Municipal code says I can write that
$500 citation every day.
TRANSCRIPT OF OCTOBER 2010 BENCH TRIAL. Page 14, line 10
through Page 15, line 3. Emphasis added.
Officer Porter testified he eventually issued nine
"letter citations", totalling $3875 in "civil fines", for
the alleged violations, so observed by Officer Porter over
the extensive period. It was this amount

$3875

which the

CITY sought to recover in the "small claims" action.
Officer Porter testified the CITY did NOT undertake an
"abatement" of the situation, by physically removing the
junk and debris. TRANSCRIPT OF OCTOBER 2010 BENCH TRIAL, at
Pages 39-40. Code Enforcement Officer Porter's testimony
was:
QUESTION (by Defendant's Attorney HOMER): But
doesn't the state code say if the person doesn't
clean it up, you put it on his taxes, you send it
to the county authorities.
ANSWER (by Witness PORTER) : This says if we abate.
We did not abate. It was my discretion not to
abate. I chose not to abate.
TRANSCRIPT OF OCTOBER 2010 BENCH TRIAL. Page 40, lines 7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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through 11. Emphasis added.
Although Defendant DECKER

requested

a

"hearing" to

challenge the CITY'S (through Officer Porter) accusations of
the "junk and debris" (paraphrased) , the CITY refused to
grant DECKER the requested "hearing" because he did not pay
the $25 hearing request fee required by city ordinance. Code
Enforcement Officer Porter testified in the District Court
bench trial:
QUESTION (by Defendant's Attorney HOMER): Going
back to 14 then, Mr. Porter, Paragraph 7, appeal
process is available and then it says "In the
event you believe" and that would be I guess the
person to whom this is issued, "you have been
issued this citation in error, you may appeal the
imposition of the civil penalty by filing an
application for hearing along with a $25 nonrefundable filing fee." That's what that paragraph
says, right?
ANSWER (by Witness PORTER): Yes, sir.
QUESTION:
Did Mr. Decker attempt to file an
application for hearing, do you know?
ANSWER:

Yes, sir.

QUESTION:

Did he pay the $25 filing fee?

ANSWER:

No, sir.

QUESTION:
He didn't. Did the city act on his
application for hearing?
ANSWER:

By act, did we have the hearing?

QUESTION:
Or decide not to have a hearing? I
realize that's a dual question.
ANSWER:
No, the hearing was not scheduled
because he did not pay the application fee.
QUESTION:

Okay. So the city's process is that

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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it costs $25 if you want to challenge
accusations against Mr. Decker?
ANSWER:

these

Yes, sir.

QUESTION:
And all other similarly situated
persons, right? Everybody who gets a citation,
civil citation they have to pay the fee?
ANSWER:

Yes, sir.

QUESTION:
Is there any process in the city's
ordinance for waiving the $25 fee?
ANSWER:

Not to my knowledge.

TRANSCRIPT OF OCTOBER 2010 BENCH TRIAL. Page 33, line 3
through Page 34, line 8. Emphasis added.
I
THE CITY'S ORDINANCE IMPOSING THE $25 HEARING REQUEST FEE
AS A PRE-CONDITION TO THE HEARING IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Article

I,

Section

12, of

the

Utah

Constitution

provides, in relevant part:
. .
In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. . . .
Emphasis added.
A
The interplay between Section 7 ["due process"] and
Section 12 ["the rights herein guaranteed"] is clear, by
reference

to the unambiguous

text. Thus,

the question

arises: is the City-required $25 "hearing request fee" in
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order to obtain the "hearing" to adjudicate the accusation
of the "violation" (in context of the "civil citation")
constitutional? Phrased differently, can the City require,
as a pre-condition to obtaining the hearing to challenge the
"civil

citation"

accusations

against

the

citizen, the

payment of a monetary fee? And in the context of this "small
claims court" civil proceeding, the question then becomes:
can the City seek and obtain a civil judgment, based upon
the enforcement officer's administrative assessment (or the
provisions of the Ordinance themselves) issuance of the
"letter citation" as a basis for civil liability, in the
face of the accused's request for hearing?
The Defendant's answer to those rhetorical questions is
a resounding "No".
It is fundamental, even "black-letter" law that "due
process" generally embodies a "hearing": the "right to be
heard". On this particular "right to be heard", the Utah
Supreme

Court

Environmental

in

V-l

Quality,

Oil

Company

939 P.2d

1192

vs

Department

(Utah 1997), has

observed:
Commentators have noted that accusatory
proceedings, due to their similarity in both form
and consequence to formal criminal proceedings,
require particular attention to due process
concerns.
Allison,
Process-Value
at
1180.
Therefore, stricter due process requirements apply
to adversarial, adjudicative decision making than
to legislative-type decision making. The most
fundamental requirement in this context is "the
opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17

of

in a meaningful manner.'" Mathews, 424 U.S. at
333, 96 S.Ct. at 902 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S. Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d
62 (1965) . . . .
939 P.2d at 1197. Emphasis added.
The above-quoted comments from the Utah Supreme Court
indicate the "due process" considerations relevant to the
"accusatory

proceedings"

such as OGDEN

CITY'S

against

Defendant DECKER. But the government cannot, per Article I,
Section

12, pre-condition

the exercise of an

"accused

person's" constitutional rights by requiring the payment of
a "hearing fee".
The constitutional proscription is universal in its
scope. The language clearly states: "In no instance shall
any accused person . . .". There are no qualifications or
limitations to the constitutional proscription. The text
thereof states "in no instance". Likewise, the CITY should
not be heard to justify its "civil penalties" processes and
results when those processes and results have been expressly
designed and structured to avoid the "constitutional rights"
the Framers intended. The Court should adopt an expansive
not restrictive

interpretation and application of the

Framers' intentions, particular when those Framers used
terminology such as "in no instance" and "any accused
person".
In this context, the Court must be aware of the
"historical"

context

of

things, as

applicable
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to the

situation at hand. Historically, "criminal" accusations were
the customary and only methodology the government utilized
to proceed against a citizen accused of a crime. In the past
couple decades, the governmental practice has arisen to
"accuse" citizens of wrongdoing, but in a manner carefully
crafted to avoid the "constitutional rights" guaranteed to
the citizen by the Utah Constitution. Indeed, the Ogden City
ordinance (ala $500 per "letter citation") and this civil
proceeding based thereon is just such an example.
Article B of Section 1-4

of the Ogden City Code

pertains generally to the "Administrative Imposition of
Civil

Penalties".

Section

1-4B-1

thereof

states

the

"purpose" thereof, thus:
The purpose of this article is to provide a
standardized procedure for the administrative
imposition of certain civil penalties authorized
under various sections, articles, chapters or
titles of this code and to encourage the
correction of the code violation without resort to
the criminal courts.
Emphasis added.
Section 1-4B-8 of the Ogden City Code provides:
1-4B-8: PAYMENT:
Any person issued a civil citation shall within
twenty (20) days of the date of notice pay the
civil penalty, unless a written request for a
hearing is filed pursuant to section 1-4B-10 of
this article.
Emphasis added. Section 1-4B-10 of the Ogden City Code,
pertaining to "Appeals", provides in relevant part:
1-4B-10: APPEALS:
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A. Request; Application: Any person
having
received a notice of violation or a civil citation
may request a hearing before a hearing officer by
filing a written application for a hearing in the
city recorder's office within (10) days of the
date of notice.. Hearings shall be conducted as
provided in title 4, chapter 4, article A of this
code. All applications for hearing shall be
accompanied by a copy of the notice of violation
and the fee established in section 4-6-1 of this
code.
Emphasis added. This is the Ordinance provision, together
with the $25 hearing request fee required by Section 4-6-1,
which is "core" to this issue.
The Defendant DECKER attempted to file the written
request for hearing, but the CITY refused to process his
request because he failed to pay the $25 hearing request
fee. Because no hearing was ever held, the administratively
imposed

"civil

Enforcement

penalties"

Officer

assessed

Porter

(in

originally

his

by

original

Code

"letter

citations") in the aggregate amount of $3875 stood, thus
prompting

the

civil

actions

to

collect

such

amounts.FOOTNOTE1
x

There is a fundamental problem
substantively
with the
CITY'S claim for the assessment of the "civil penalty" against
the Defendant. Although subsection "A" of Section 1-4A-1 of the
Ogden City Code identifies and provides for the standard
"criminal" penalties for "violations" of the municipality's
ordinances, subsection "B" additionally provides for "civil
penalties". It is presumed that these provisions
subsection "B
of Section 1-4A-1 of the Ogden City Code
are relied upon to
justify the administrative imposition of the "civil penalties"
against Defendant DECKER in this case.
The City's reliance thereon is flawed, in light of the
express language of the ordinance provision, which states in
relevant part:
B.
Civil Penalties:
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Because

the

constitutional

proscription

is

clearly

implicated and violated by the Ordinance, the Ordinance is
unconstitutional.
Because
Defendant

the

civil

entered

against

the

is based upon an administrative

process

thus

presumptively defective

judgment

(lack of

"due process" hearing,

because the "hearing request fee" was not paid, as per the
Ordinance now unconstitutional) , the civil judgment of $3875
is invalid and must be set aside.
Numerous
consistently

Utah

appellate

invalidated

contravention

to

court

municipal

constitutional

decisions

have

ordinances

proscriptions

in
and

protections. See, for example, State by and through Hansen
vs Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 2d 318, 445 P.2d 691 (Utah 1968)
[ordinance

conflicting

with

constitutional

guarantees

(Fourth Amendment) is invalid] ; Salt Lake City vs Wheeler,
24

Utah

2d

conflicting

112, 466
with

P.2d

838

(Utah

constitutional

1970)

guarantees

[ordinance
(Fourth

Amendment) is invalid] ; Weber Basin Homebuilders Association
vs Roy City, 26 Utah 2d 215, 487 P.2d 866

(Utah 1971),

1.
In addition to the penalties provided above, a
court upon conviction may sentence a person convicted
of an offense, other than a violation of title 10 of
this code, to a civil penalty in the following amounts:
Emphasis added. In the instant situation, there were no "court"
proceedings resulting in a "conviction". Code Enforcement Officer
Porter is not "a court". The City's administrative imposition of
the "civil penalty" is fundamentally flawed, for substantive
reasons.
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i

[excessive building permit fee used for general revenue
violates constitutional standards].
A

district

court's

(

ruling

regarding

the

constitutionality of a regulatory fee is a mixed question of
law and fact; it is reviewed under a clearly erroneous

*

standard for questions of fact and a correctness standard
for questions of law. D.D.A. vs State (State ex rel D.A,),
2009 UT 83, 222 P.3d 1172 (Utah 2009), Tooele Associates
Limited Partnership vs Tooele City Corporation, 2011 UT 04,
247 P. 3d 371 (Utah Supreme Court 2011) . A local government's
fee setting procedure may be tested against an arbitrary,
capricious

or

illegal

standard

of

review,

but

a

reasonableness test to determine that the actual fee is

<

invalid. Walker vs Brigham City, 856 P.2d 347 (Utah 1993).
The presumption of constitutionality attaching to a local
government ordinance can be overcome if the challenger shows
the regulatory fee is "so unreasonable and disproportionate
to the services rendered as to attack the good faith of the
law" . V-1 Oil Company vs Utah State Tax Commission, 94 2 P. 2d
906 (Utah 1997) .
In

the

instant

situation,

the

Ogden

City

"civil

citation" fine of $500 every time the code enforcement
officer sends out the "letter citation" for the claimed
"violation" (which is itself never actually litigated) is
"so unreasonable

and

disproportionate

to

the
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services

{

rendered" that the Ordinance can be attacked. If the $500
"fine"

is

allowed,

especially

in

the

face

of

the

requirements of Section 10-11-1 of the Utah Code (actual
costs of clean-up can be recovered) , there would be no limit
to the amount of money the CITY could collect. In extreme
cases, the CITY could fund the entirety of its governmental
operations from such "fees", while never actually incurring
any actual cost or expense, because the statutorily-required
"clean up" was never effected.
While the "civil penalty" assessed and imposed against
Defendant DECKER is hardly a "tax" or even a "fee for
service"

and

for

that

reason

the

jurisprudence

and

analysis of Tooele Associates and cases cited therein may
not be directly applicable

the "constitutional" principles

discussed therein are seemingly relevant to the situation at
hand. This is particularly the situation given the fact that
the CITY actually incurred no expenses in the non-existent
clean-up (as described by statute) and that the $500 per
letter "civil penalty" bears absolutely no relationship to
those non-existent expenses. Simply stated, the $500 "civil
penalty"

administratively

Officer

Porter

is

assessed by Code Enforcement

unconstitutionally

excessive

and

impermissible, as a matter of law.
B
The constitutional "due process" violation comes into
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(

play as a result of the generalized application of the "$500
per

letter

citation"

"violations", not

civil

otherwise

fine

imposed

for

the

<

criminally prosecuted. The

Defendant has a "constitutional right" under Article I,
Section 7 not to be deprived of his "property"

(in this

case, his money: the $500, or in the aggregate, the $3875)
without "due process of law".
In the instant situation, the provisions of Section 1011-1 et seq, Utah Code, come into play. [The complete text
of Section 10-11-1 et seq, Utah Code, is included herein as

.

ATTACHMENT 1 to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF.] Those statutory
provisions provide for the mandatory (the word "shall" is
consistently used throughout the chapter) procedure in cases

(

where municipal inspectors observed "junk and debris" on
privately-owned lots within the geopolitical jurisdictional
boundaries of the municipality. Such should have been the
situation here. But rather than complying with the statute
(i.e. notice to the propertyowner, followed by clean-up,
with the expenses thereof being placed "on the taxes" with
an "appeal" thereof to the County Commission), Officer
Porter just

"cranks out" the citation letters. Such a

.

process in clear contradiction to the statute ought to be
"unconstitutional" : that is, the municipality of OGDEN CITY,
not having the attributes of sovereignty, must obey the
statutes which are applicable to it. If it fails to do so in
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(

its dealings with its citizens, the citizen's "due process
of law" rights are violated.
Section 10-11-2, Utah Code, provides in relevant part:
It shall be the duty of such city inspector to
make careful examination and investigation, as may
be provided by ordinance, of the growth and spread
of such injurious and noxious weeds, and of
garbage, refuse or unsightly or deleterious
objects or structures; and it shall be his duty to
ascertain the names of the owners . . .
Emphasis added.
Section 10-11-3 continues to describe the "mandatory"
(through the legislative text) process applicable in the
event the propertyowner fails to respond to the "notice" to
clean up the property. Section 10-11-3 provides in relevant
part:
If any owner or occupant of lands described in
such notice shall fail or neglect to eradicate, or
destroy and remove, such weeds, garbage, refuse,
object or structure upon the premises in
accordance with such note, it shall be the duty of
the inspector, at the expense of the municipality/
to employ necessary assistance and cause such
weeds, garbage, refuse, objects or structures to
be removed or destroyed. He shall prepare an
itemized statement of all expenses incurred in the
removal and destruction of the same and shall mail
a copy thereof to the owner demanding payment
within twenty days of the date of mailing. . . .
Emphasis added. Section 10-11-3 continues by stating that
the inspector (and his employing municipality) may bring
civil litigation to recover the costs of the removal,
including reasonable attorney's fees and costs. The statute
also authorizes the inspector to submit the claim for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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reimbursement of the municipality's expenses to county
taxing authorities, for inclusion in the real property
taxes. Again, the mandatory verb

"shall" is utilized.

Section

opportunity

10-11-4

provides

for

an

for

the

propertyowner to challenge the municipality's claims, in a
hearing before the county commission.
The "bottom line" to all this is this:
1.

The municipality, in this precise "weeds and

debris" (paraphrased) situation, is obligated to
actually incur the expense of clean-up.
2.

Correspondingly, the accused propertyowner is

legislatively-entitled to pay only those amounts
which were incurred by the municipality in the
actual clean-up of the parcel.
In the instant situation, there was no clean-up. The CITY
incurred no expenses.
Thus, Defendant DECKER is not liable for any payment
(to the CITY) for the non-existent expenses (of clean-up)
the CITY did not incur. The CITY'S attempt to collect the
"$500 per letter" fee ("civil penalty"), at $3875 greatly in
excess of the $0 amount actually incurred by the CITY in its
conscious decision to not effect the clean-up, contravenes
DECKER'S statutory rights (the he pays for the clean-up
expenses). The CITY'S attempt to impose and collect "civil
penalties"

in

excess

of

the

amounts

prescribed
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by

controlling statute (which says, essentially, $0) violates
the Defendant's "constitutional rights" of "due process of
law" under Article I, Section 7.
It is paradoxical, even ironic, that in this situation
the CITY is, within the administrative "letter citation"
process, accusing Defendant DECKER of violating the "weeds
and debris" ordinances (and is thus liable for the payment
of "civil penalty") when the CITY itself is unwilling to
accept

and comply with the requirements

of

"the law"

directly and specifically applicable to the "weeds and
debris" situation: the provisions of Section 10-11-3, Utah
Code, legislatively mandated upon the CITY for this exact
situation.
II
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS TAKEN PURSUANT TO
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
As shown above, the CITY'S actions in denying the
Defendant's request for hearing violates Article I, Section
7

of

the Utah

Constitution.

Thus,

the

administrative

imposition of the $3875 in civil fines against the Defendant
is fundamentally defective and invalid. That administrative
action must be set aside and vacated. See West Valley City
vs Foy, 100 P. 3d 275 (Utah Court of Appeals 2004) [tenant's
timely-filed request for hearing precluded summary judgment
in favor of municipality for claimed administrative fines
imposed in spite of request for hearing].
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Ill
THE CIVIL JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST DEFENDANT
IS INVALID
Because

the

underlying

administrative

claim

(of

indebtedness owing in the amount of $3 875) is invalid by
reason

of

the

Defendant's
District

CITY'S

unconstitutional

constitutional

Court's

civil

right

of

judgment

denial

of

the

due

process,

the

based

upon

that

administrative determination is invalid. The District Court
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff CITY and against the
Defendant DECKER in the amount of $3875 should be set aside
and the case remanded to the District Court for dismissal of
the action.
CONCLUSION
The CITY'S Ordinance providing for the administrative
imposition of civil fines in the face of the accused
citizen's request for hearing to challenge those impositions
is

unconstitutional.

The

imposed

civil

fines

administratively assessed are thus invalid. The civil case
filed by the CITY to judicially collect those invalidly
imposed administrative fines is correspondingly defective,
and the monetary judgment entered therein must be set aside.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of June, 2011.

At/orrvey for Defendant
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Assistant Ogden City Attorney, Office of the Ogden City
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Suite #840, Ogden, Utah 84401, this 30th day of June, 2011.
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UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE

10-10-1

(b) by imposing the appropriate civil penalty adopted
under the authority of this section.
2005
CHAPTER 10
CITIES OF FIRST AND SECOND CLASS [REPEALED]
10-10-1 to 10-10-75.

Repealed.

1961,1977,1979,1988

CHAPTER 11
INSPECTION AND CLEANING
Section
10-11-1.
10-11-2.
10-11-3.
10-11-4.

Abatement of weeds, garbage, refuse, and unsightly objects.
Notice to property owners.
Neglect of property owners — Removal by city —
Costs of removal.
Costs of removal to be included in tax notice.

10-11-1. Abatement of weeds, garbage, refuse, and unsightly objects.
A municipal legislative body may designate, and regulate
the abatement of, injurious and noxious weeds, garbage,
refuse, or any unsightly or deleterious objects or structures,
and may appoint a municipal inspector for the purpose of
carrying out the provisions of this chapter.
2003

10-11-2. Notice to property owners.
It shall be the duty of such city inspector to make careful
examination and investigation, as may be provided by ordinance, of the growth and spread of such injurious and noxious
weeds, and of garbage, refuse or unsightly or deleterious
objects or structures; and it shall be his duty to ascertain the
names of the owners and descriptions of the premises where
such weeds, garbage, refuse, objects or structures exist, and to
serve notice in writing upon the owner or occupant of such
land, either personally or by mailing notice, postage prepaid,
addressed to the owner or occupant at the last known postoffice address as disclosed by the records of the county assessor, requiring such owner or occupant, as the case may be, to
eradicate, or destroy and remove, the same within such time
as the inspector may designate, which shall not be less than
ten days from the date of service of such notice. One notice
shall be deemed sufficient on any lot or parcel of property for
the entire season of weed growth during that year. The
inspector shall make proof of service of such notice under oath,
and file the same in the office of the county treasurer. 1953

408

(2) (a) If the owner fails to make payment of the amount
set forth in the statement to the municipal treasurer
within the required 30 days, the inspector, on behalf of the
municipality, may:
(i) cause suit to be brought in an appropriate court
of law; or
(ii) refer the matter to the county treasurer as
provided in Subsection (2)(c).
(b) If collection of the costs are pursued through the
courts, the municipality may:
(i) sue for and receive judgment upon all of the
costs of removal and destruction, including administrative costs, together with reasonable attorneys'
fees, interest, and court costs; and
(ii) execute on the judgment in the manner provided by law.
(c) If the inspector elects to refer the matter to the
county treasurer for inclusion in the tax notice of the
property owner, the inspector shall:
(i) make, in triplicate, an itemized statement of all
expenses, including administrative expenses, incurred in the removal and destruction of the weeds,
garbage, refuse, objects, or structures; and
(ii) deliver the three copies of the statement to the
county treasurer within ten days after the expiration
of the 30-day period provided in the statement under
Subsection (l)(a)(ii).
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10-11-4. Costs of removal to be included in tax notice.
Upon receipt of the itemized statement of the cost of
destroying or removing such weeds, refuse, garbage, objects,
or structures, the county treasurer shall forthwith mail one
copy to the owner of the land from which the same were
removed, together with a notice that objection in writing may
be made within 30 days to the whole or any part of the
statement so filed to the county legislative body. The county
treasurer shall at the same time deliver a copy of the statement to the clerk of the county legislative body. If objections to
any statement are filed with the county legislative body, they
shall set a date for hearing, giving notice thereof, and upon the
hearing fix and determine the actual cost of removing the
weeds, garbage, refuse, or unsightly or deleterious objects or
structures, and report their findings to the county treasurer. If
no objections to the items of the account so filed are made
within 30 days of the date of mailing such itemized statement,
the county treasurer shall enter the amount of such statement
on the assessment rolls of the county in the column prepared
for that purpose, and likewise within ten days from the date of
the action of the county legislative body upon objections filed
shall enter in the prepared column upon the tax rolls the
amount found by the county legislative body as the cost of
removing and destroying the said weeds, refuse, garbage or
unsightly and deleterious objects or structures. If current tax
notices have been mailed, said taxes may be carried over on
the rolls to the following year. After the entry by the county
treasurer of the costs of removing weeds, garbage, refuse or
unsightly and deleterious objects or structures the amount so
entered shall have the force and effect of a valid judgment of
the district court, and shall be a lien upon the lands from
which the weeds, refuse, garbage or unsightly and deleterious
objects or structures were removed and destroyed, and shall
be collected by the county treasurer at the time of the payment
of general taxes. Upon payment thereof receipt shall be
acknowledged upon the general tax receipt issued by the
treasurer.
1993

10-11-3. Neglect of property owners — Removal by city
— Costs of removal.
(1) (a) If any owner or occupant of lands described in the
notice under Section 10-11-2 fails or neglects to eradicate,
or destroy and remove, the weeds, garbage, refuse, objects, or structure upon the premises in accordance with
the notice, the inspector shall:
(i) at the expense of the municipality, employ necessary assistance and cause the weeds, garbage,
refuse, objects, or structures to be removed or destroyed; and
(ii) prepare an itemized statement of all expenses,
including administrative expenses, incurred in the
removal and destruction of the weeds, garbage, refuse, objects, or structures and mail a copy of the
CHAPTER 12
statement to the owner demanding payment within
30 days of the date of mailing.
BUDGET SYSTEM IN CITIES OF THIRD CLASS
(b) Each notice under Subsection (l)(a) shall be consid[REPEALED]
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